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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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The Folly of Consequence-free Budget Scoring 
Presenter: Gerald S. Koenig is Managing Director of Hannon Armstrong Advisory Services, a firm that 
advises government and corporate clients on the economics and financing of critical infrastructure needs. 
He has over twenty years of experience in senior executive and legal positions and served both on the 
White House staff under President Ronald Reagan and in the Office of Secretary of Defense under 
Richard Cheney. Mr. Koenig received a BS in engineering from West Point, an MA in International 
Relations from USC, and a JD in International Business Transactions from the George Mason University 
School of Law; he is a member of the District of Columbia Bar. 
HA Advisory Services advises government and corporate clients on how to use multiyear Federal funding 
to acquire critical infrastructure needs. HA Advisory Services is an affiliate of Hannon Armstrong Capital, 
which for over 25 years has provided financing for government infrastructure projects.  
Things and actions are what they are, and the 
consequences of them will be what they will be; 
why, then, should we desire to be deceived? 
Bishop Joseph Butler 
1692-1752 
Overview 
Current Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget scoring rules cheat taxpayers and 
warfighters by ignoring the high cost of not acquiring cost-effective upgrades to critical combat 
weapons.  Treating paid-over-time procurements as if they are paid-up-front budget outlays 
necessarily perpetuates waste and inefficiency where we can least afford it: on the modern 
battlefield. As a result, the current acquisition process for such upgrades involves a simplistic, 
two-step process.  First, determine if paying the entire cost up-front of an upgrade is less 
expensive than the net present value of paying for the upgrade over time.  Once paying up-front 
is “discovered” to be the cheaper option (as nearly always occurs), the next step is to abandon 
the upgrade as soon as it fails to compete successfully for scarce procurement budget dollars.  
An extremely conscientious program official may repeat this process for a number of budget 
cycles.  But in the end, the outcome is predictable.  The game is just rigged that way. 
The problem is that these policies have real consequences that squander taxpayer 
dollars while degrading battlefield performance.  Many of America’s major combat weapons 
systems have engines that are so old and obsolete that modern upgrades would easily pay for 
themselves in fuel and maintenance savings while dramatically increasing combat range and 
battlefield reliability.  The private sector is willing to give the DoD such upgrades at no upfront 
cost in exchange for annual “mortgage-like” payments that are never greater than verified 
savings in fuel and maintenance.  How can we know this?  Because the DoD has routinely used 
such “paid-from-savings” contracts for over a decade to upgrade infrastructure on military 
bases.  Similar contracts are widely used by the DoD to acquire vast amounts of information 
technology and telecommunication assets.   
But when legislation was introduced in Congress to extend paid-from-savings contracts 
to combat platforms, the CBO “scored” the legislation so high that it effectively killed the 
legislative effort. The CBO insists that paid-over-time acquisitions should “score” for budget 
purposes in the same manner as if an outright purchase was made—even if the payments-over-
time are limited by law to the verified savings produced by the acquisition.  By counting the 
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payments and ignoring the savings as “speculative,” the CBO ensures wasteful outcomes; the 
more an upgrade saves, the more the CBO will assert it costs. 
The CBO claims that accounting for acquisitions in any other manner is inconsistent with 
the Budget Act of 1967.  The fact is that that Act and all Federal budget laws are silent on this 
issue.  The CBO’s position is really a hunch—no more than one interpretation of general 
principles.  The CBO’s counterpart in the Executive Branch, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), reaches the opposite conclusion. 
The CBO views its scoring policy in a consequence-free vacuum and sees its role as a 
dispassionate arbiter of how to apply general budget principles to specific legislation.  Actual 
outcomes are seen as irrelevant—or, at the very least, as highly speculative and, therefore, 
properly dismissed.   
Supporting this dysfunctional acquisition system is an almost smug attitude among many 
defense acquisition policy apparatchiks. Unfortunately, military and civilian officials who should 
be fierce advocates for warfighters on such policy issues are missing in action on this issue.  
Since the Boeing tanker lease scandal, anyone who challenges the orthodoxy of traditional 
defense procurement is considered, at best, politically tone-deaf. 
Government accounting procedures should serve the mission of the government—not 
vice-versa.  If the National defense mission of the Federal government is important enough to 
siphon off wealth from citizens in the form of taxes, the first rule should be that every tax dollar 
must buy the most combat power possible.  Budget rules that frustrate this purpose need to be 
changed.   
Why Inefficiency Matters on Combat Platforms 
The President’s 2006 State of the Union address should resonate in many quarters, 
including in the President’s own Executive Branch.  Nowhere is the “addiction to oil” that the 
President cited more serious than in the Federal government, which enjoys the distinction of 
being the largest single consumer of energy in the world.  Within the Federal government, the 
Department of Defense leads all agencies in consumption of oil.  This is not surprising, 
considering the vast arsenal of tanks, ships, aircraft and bases that the DoD uses in its critical 
warfighting operations.   
What is surprising, however, is how brave Americans are sent into battle with obsolete 
oil-consuming systems that would be cheaper to replace with state-of-the-art upgrades.  Some 
of our most famous aircraft and other weapons systems are long overdue for new engines since 
their forty-year-old engines are underpowered and undependable—and waste billions of 
taxpayer dollars on fuel.   
Breaking any addiction requires that one first admit there is a problem.  As taxpayers, we 
have a problem with Federal accounting rules that are rigged to waste our tax dollars.  As for 
warfighters, their problem is that these same policies send them into battle with second-rate 
equipment.  But all of us have a common problem: Federal accountants clearly could not care 
less about these outcomes; their attitude is simple:  It’s not my department. 
Since the American Revolution, how the government buys military goods and services 
been a source of constant concern—and with good reason.  Failing to get the most for each 
taxpayer dollars is always bad, but it is hard to imagine a greater abomination than when 
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American warfighters are sent into battle with second-rate equipment when first-rate equipment 
could bought at less cost.  Historically, war profiteers and corrupt bureaucrats are the usual 
suspects, but here the culprits are myopic budget officials.    
Most Americans would be surprised to learn that some of our best-known weapons are 
grossly underpowered by forty-year-old engines that cheat warfighters of combat range and 
power while cheating taxpayers by guzzling gas and requiring ever-increasing amounts of 
maintenance.  Reengining with state-of-the-art engines could give warfighters the best “bang for 
the buck” while taxpayers would harvest a windfall in savings.  The savings are so great and so 
certain that the private sector has offered the DoD a compelling offer: Let us give you the new 
engines, and you can pay us back from the savings—but only if and when those savings 
materialize. 
The DoD routinely accepts such offers when the stakes are low, such as upgrading 
energy systems on military bases.  Congress created Energy Savings Performance Contracts in 
the 1990s for exactly this purpose.  Since then, billions of taxpayer dollars have been saved 
using these “paid-from-savings-over-time” contracts.  The advantage is not just a matter of 
making defense contractors guarantee savings.  The real advantage is that these contracts 
break the cycle in which aging engines rarely compete successfully for full, up-front funding in 
the Federal budget process.   
That cycle is, after all, how these assets got to be old and obsolete in the first place.  
Nevertheless, many OMB and CBO budget officials fail to see this is a problem, despite it being 
documented in numerous DoD and Air Force studies and reports to Congress.  The accountants 
remain fixed in their belief that if replacing obsolete engines was important enough, the DoD’s 
limited capital budget would be allocated to that purpose.  These same accountants are not 
bothered that the other major part of the defense spending, the “operations and maintenance” 
budget, is being drained by these gas-guzzling maintenance hogs year-in and year-out—even 
when offered a paid-from-savings solution that pays for the new engines out of savings from 
existing operations and maintenance budget levels. Tough luck, soldier, is their bottom line. 
Of course, buying anything over time is more expensive than paying cash up-front.  But 
as long as there is a National Debt, even capital appropriations from Congress cost the 
taxpayers interest.  Thus, the issue is really how much more interest does an Energy Savings 
Performance contract cost the taxpayers, and what do the taxpayers get for that extra cost?  
Moreover, the real world choice is not just between buying outright or buying over time.  The 
third—and most often selected—choice is simply to do nothing. 
Unfortunately, doing nothing can be the worst choice of all.  This is exactly what is 
occurring in a surprising number of combat fleets, from Abrams tanks to B-52 Bombers.  To be 
clear, a legacy tank, aircraft or ship itself may still have decades of useful life.  After all, it’s hard 
to wear out a tank.  And until some new enemy advances Panzer-technology, the Abrams tank 
is unlikely to meet its match on a battlefield anytime soon.  The same goes for B-52 and the 
Joint STARS aircraft fleets—and any number of other legacy fleets.   
But technology advances at different rates in different areas.  So, while these ships, 
tanks and aircraft may still be perfectly suited for battle, their engines often are not.  Engine 
technology has advanced so profoundly in the last few decades that state-of-the-art engines can 
quickly pay for themselves in fuel and maintenance savings—and do this while providing greater 
power, combat range and battlefield reliability.  A recent Air Force study estimated that 
reengining the B-52 fleet alone would pay for itself in less than half of the remaining life of the 
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airframe, extend combat range by 30% and save so much fuel that even in peacetime, it would 
be equivalent to taking over 144,000 cars off the road each year. 
None of this is disputed by the DoD, Congress or the White House.  So, why are we still 
sending brave Americans into battle with obsolete equipment that costs taxpayers more than 
state-of-the-art alternatives?  The reason is simple: Federal accountants are blocking combat 
upgrades that save money and lives because their accounting rules are based on bad logic. 
Just as with energy system upgrades on military bases, there are generally three 
choices with obsolete engines.  First, you can buy the upgrade outright, assuming that 
reengining B-52s, Joint STARS or Abrams tanks can compete for scarce capital appropriations. 
Second, you can buy the upgrade over time, matching payments with the savings produced by 
the upgrade, thereby spending no more in any given year than would have otherwise been 
spent.  Third, you can do nothing.   
Again, no one disputes these alternatives.  In fact, a recent DoD study submitted to 
Congress even identified the lifecycle costs for each of these three alternatives for replacing the 
forty-year-old engines on one of America’s most successful combat aircraft: Joint STARS: 
Option A: Outright Purchase: $ 1.0 Billion 
Option B: Purchase Over Time: $ 1.2 Billion 
Option C: Do Nothing: $ 1.5 Billion 
Any reasonable person would quickly understand that Option A is the best choice.  And 
if for some reason Option A is not possible, Option B is the next best alternative.  Clearly, 
Option C is the worst choice. 
But when viewed through the prism of Federal budget policy, the logic gets twisted in 
this way:  Because Option B costs more than Option A, Option B must be eliminated from any 
further consideration.  So the choice is between Option A and Option C.  But history shows 
Option A is not a realistic possibility, since the DoD usually has more urgent priorities than 
replacing engines that, after all, still work.  So Option C is the end result. 
Privately, everyone agrees that Option A is not likely to happen.  Like a frog in boiling 
water, Federal decision-makers never really feel the pain of creeping obsolescence in weapons 
systems.  As a result, even the most economically sound upgrades rarely compete successfully 
for budget dollars against higher priorities.  Nor is this necessarily a bad decision.  Imagine 
having to choose between upgrading Humvees with either new armor against roadside bombs 
or a new engine.  New armor will save lives right away, so it should (and does) get priority.     
This example is representative of the difficult choices made every day.  The point is that 
even if we assume that DoD and Congress sort out these priorities properly, shouldn’t Option B 
at least remain on the table for consideration?  If “paid-from-savings” contracts are a legitimate 
tool for upgrading the rear echelon, why shouldn’t the tool be available on the front line? 
Several years ago, a bipartisan group of Senators and Congressmen ranging from 
Senators Sue Collins to Pat Roberts to Hillary Clinton introduced legislation that would allow the 
DoD to use Energy Savings Performance Contracts to upgrade combat aircraft, ships and 
vehicles.  This was a bill (S. 2318 / H.R. 3339) that appealed to hawks, environmentalists and 
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anti-government waste advocates equally.  There was no apparent opposition until the CBO and 
OMB accountants successfully killed the effort.   
The CBO asserted that Energy Saving Performance Contracts outlays are real, but their 
savings are speculative—even though they are, by law, a mathematical identity.  The House 
Energy Committee Chairman, Joe Barton, called the CBO’s reasoning “absurd,” and Senate 
Energy Committee Chairman (and former Budget Committee Chairman) Pete Domenici stated: 
“CBO views these contracts as outlays by the federal government.  The truth is that these 
contracts cost the government nothing.”   
But because of the CBO, Congress was barely able to muster the votes to reauthorize 
these contracts for use in upgrading military buildings, gagging down a $2.8 billion “score” from 
the CBO. Tragically for our warfighters and taxpayers, the CBO’s Alice-in-Wonderland 
accounting estimated an expansion of these contracts for use on combat systems at about $15 
billion.  This “cost” was too much for anyone to ignore, but not enough for anyone to engage in a 
political firefight with the CBO.  So, the Energy Act of 2005 was passed with Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts for military buildings fully reauthorized, but nothing authorized for 
battlefield assets.  
The great irony is that the CBO’s scoring policy makes it painful to save a little taxpayer 
money and impossible to save a lot. 
Contributing to and applauding this perverse outcome is the OMB, the accountants for 
the Executive Branch, including the DoD.  To their credit, the OMB believes that Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts cost the government nothing.  But the OMB went out of its way to 
disparage using this proven tool to upgrade combat systems.  The reason?  Only that, “it is 
inconsistent with Federal fiscal and procurement policies.”  No kidding… 
In a less dangerous world, wasting defense dollars by equipping our warfighters with 
second-rate equipment that costs more than first-rate alternatives would simply be irrational.  
But for the foreseeable future, irrational budget policies will continue to have very real and 
dangerous consequences for the brave Americans we send into battle.   
Warfighters deserve more respect than these accountants give them.  And the Bush 
Administration and Congress should get serious about where their priorities are: with the 
taxpayers and warfighters, or with the accountants. 
Background 
The original statute creating Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) was the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Public Law 102-486, enacted October 24, 1992, codified at 42 USC 
8287.  The CBO scored the ESPC provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 at zero. 
The sunset date of the original statute was amended to become October 1, 2003, by the 
Energy Conservation Reauthorization Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-388, enacted November 13, 
1998).  Again, the CBO scored the ESPC provisions of the Energy Conservation 
Reauthorization Act of 1998 at zero. 
The CBO reversed this decade-old policy of scoring ESPCs at zero on April 7, 2003 in 
their Cost Estimate for H.R. 1346, in which the CBO stated:  
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Currently, federal agencies can enter into an ESPC, a specific type of long-term 
contract, for the purchase of energy efficiency equipment, such as new windows and 
lighting.  Using such equipment can reduce the energy costs for a facility.  When using 
an ESPC, the savings from reduced energy bills are used to pay for the purchase of the 
new equipment over several years.  The commitment to make such payments is made 
when the ESPC is entered into.  Thus, consistent with governmentwide accounting 
principles, CBO believes that the budget should reflect that commitment as new 
obligations at the time that an ESPC is signed.  Currently, agencies can use ESPCs to 
purchase new equipment over a 25-year period without an appropriation for the full 
amount of the purchase price. 
DOE estimates that agencies entered into ESPCs valued over $800 million since 1988.  
CBO estimates that, because the federal building inventory is aging, those contracts 
would continue to be used over time at roughly the same rate currently used, or $75 
million in 2004 and increasing after that.  Thus, we estimate that extending the 
authorization for ESPCs would increase direct spending by about $64 million in 2004 
and $1.1 billion over the 2004-2013 period. 
This Cost Estimate was prepared by Lisa Cash Driskill and approved by Peter H. 
Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 
The following day, on April 8, 2003, the CBO published their Cost Estimate for H.R. 6, 
which states:  
Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs). Section 11006 of H.R. 6 would 
provide permanent authorization to use ESPCs and would expand their use. The 
expansion would allow agencies to use an ESPC to construct replacement buildings by 
committing to pay private contractors a portion of the budget savings expected from 
reduced operations, maintenance, and energy costs at such new buildings. CBO 
estimates that this provision would cost $75 million in 2004, $879 million over the 2004-
2008 period, and $2.8 billion over the next 10 years.  
Again, this section of the Cost Estimate for H.R. 6 was prepared by Lisa Cash Driskill 
and approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 
In sum, the CBO recognized that ESPCs cost the government nothing and scored ESPC 
authorization and reauthorization at zero in 1992 and 1998, respectively.  In 2003, with no 
meaningful explanation, CBO reversed this policy and scored ESPCs as direct spending.  
For its part, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rejects the CBO’s new ESPC 
scoring policy and continues to score ESPCs as budget-neutral except for termination liability, 
which is scored only if and when such termination actually occurs.  This OMB policy is set forth 
in the July 25, 1998, OMB memorandum Federal Use of Energy Savings Performance 
Contracting (Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb /memoranda/m98-13.pdf). 
This policy, originally established in the Clinton Administration, was reaffirmed as the 
policy of the Bush Administration by the Secretary of Energy in letters to the Chairmen of the 
House and Senate Energy Committees, dated April 8, 2004, in which Secretary Abraham 
states: 
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The legislation itself extending ESPC authority is considered budget neutral and does 
not require additional resources, as the Office of Management and Budget classifies all 
budget authority and outlays for ESPCs as absorbing discretionary resources.  However, 
ESPCs actually save the government money, because the upfront costs of ESPC 
efficiency improvements are recovered through the energy savings that result.  
Moreover, payments to the contractors are contingent upon realizing a guaranteed 
stream of future cost savings. 
Improved energy efficiency and conservation at Federal facilities is an important 
component of this Administration’s commitment to the cost-effective use of public dollars 
and protection of the environment.  The Administration urges Congress to act quickly to 
the authorization of this important program. 
Thus, the consistent position of the Executive Branch through both the Clinton and 
current Bush Administrations is that ESPCs should be scored at zero.  The reasoning for this is 
compelling since, contrary to CBO’s claim that the government’s “commitment to make such 
payments is made when the ESPC is entered into,” the government’s commitment to make 
payments under an ESPC only is made when, and to the extent, savings are achieved in each 
year of the ESPC.  This is set forth explicitly in 42 USC 8287 (B), which states:  
Aggregate annual payments by an agency to both utilities and energy savings 
performance contractors, under an energy savings performance contract, may not 
exceed the amount that the agency would have paid for utilities without an energy 
savings performance contract (as estimated through the procedures developed pursuant 
to this section) during contract years. 
Thus, contrary to the CBO’s assertion that its new ESPC scoring policy is, “consistent 
with governmentwide accounting principles,” no other entity within the federal government has 
ever accepted the CBO’s policy.  Just the opposite is true:  Not scoring ESPC payments is, and 
always has been, the governmentwide accounting principle. 
Economic Logic Compels ESPCs Scoring at Zero 
The fundamental economic basis for not scoring ESPCs is that the opportunity cost of an 
ESPC (i.e., the government’s next best alternative to the ESPC) is to continue to pay (what by 
law must be) a higher amount for ongoing energy and maintenance costs on the aging 
infrastructure that the ESPC would upgrade. 
The fact that ESPCs must reduce pre-existing government obligations makes ESPCs 
unique among all financing vehicles available to the government.  Scoring ESPC payments 
without deducting the higher payments the government would otherwise make results in double 
counting of the true scope of the government obligation.   
Put another way, if a government obligation of $100 is replaced with a lesser 
government obligation of $90, the correct scoring is not $190.  While one could argue that the 
proper score in this case is $90, proponents of ESPCs only ask that the more conservative 
amount of $100 be recognized as a complete offset to the original $100.   
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The fact is that using an ESPC cannot increase Federal obligations.  At worst, the 
Federal obligation remains at the same level it would have been if no ESPC were used.  It is this 
worst-case scenario that produces a zero score in any rational budget treatment.   
Accounting Logic Compels ESPCs Scoring at Zero 
Recognizing that accounting principles sometimes differ from their underlying economic 
theory, it is worth reviewing ESPC scoring through a purely accounting prism.  In the most 
general sense, Federal accounting divides Federal spending into Operations & Maintenance 
(O&M) accounts and Capital accounts.  In a classic Federal acquisition, an upgrade is 
purchased by an agency using Capital appropriations provided for that specific purpose by 
Congress, almost always without any statutory offset requirements.  In such a case, the entire 
amount of that Capital appropriation is properly scored as direct spending.  Linking this to its 
underlying economic justification, it can be said that Congress could spend that appropriation on 
anything else; thus, its opportunity cost is the full amount of the Capital appropriation. 
An ESPC is fundamentally different from such a classic Federal acquisition, precisely 
because it only draws on the existing stream of the applicable O&M account over the term of the 
ESPC.  The key factor that compels a zero-score accounting treatment is that the ESPC cannot 
ever draw more from that O&M account than would have been drawn if the ESPC had not been 
executed.  Moreover, the ESPC can never create Federal obligations from any Capital account.  
Again, linking this to its underlying economic justification, Congress could not spend that portion 
of the O&M account appropriation on anything else, since it would be spent on fuel and 
maintenance for the aging asset in the absence of an ESPC; thus, the opportunity cost of an 
ESPC is spending the same (or greater) amount of O&M appropriation. 
In sum, unless there is a contract termination, ESPCs cannot ever lead to an increase in 
the amount of money that Congress would have otherwise appropriated for any O&M or Capital 
account. 
To be clear, termination of an ESPC can trigger a Federal obligation that would exceed 
the normal O&M account funding stream.  Congress recognized this when it created ESPCs in 
1992 and explicitly set forth how such an event should be scored.  This provision, codified in 42 
USC 8287, states:   
1. A Federal agency may enter into a multiyear contract under this subchapter for a period 
not to exceed 25 years, without funding of cancellation charges before cancellation, if— 
(i) such contract was awarded in a competitive manner pursuant to subsection 
(b)(2) of this section, using procedures and methods established under this subchapter;  
(ii) funds are available and adequate for payment of the costs of such contract for 
the first fiscal year;  
(iii) 30 days before the award of any such contract that contains a clause setting 
forth a cancellation ceiling in excess of $10,000,000, the head of such agency gives 
written notification of such proposed contract and of the proposed cancellation ceiling for 
such contract to the appropriate authorizing and appropriating committees of the 
Congress; and  
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(iv) such contract is governed by part 17.1 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
promulgated under section 421 of title 41 or the applicable rules promulgated under this 
subchapter.  
Thus, the proper accounting treatment to provide for possible termination is not a matter 
for debate or interpretation; it is explicitly established by Congress in Federal law.  To the extent 
that the CBO justifies its radical scoring of ESPCs by citing termination liability exposure, it is 
contrary to the consensus of Congress expressed in this statute. 
Moreover, this law makes tremendous sense and reaches the proper economic result.  
Accounting for termination costs is clearly appropriate when a termination occurs.  But since no 
one knows the future with certainly, the termination liability amount should be discounted by the 
likelihood of a termination actually occurring.  Historical data shows that less than 1% of all 
Federal contracts are terminated, either for government convenience or contractor default.  
Twelve years of experience shows that ESPCs’ rate of termination is much better than these 
government-wide averages.   
What Does It Matter? 
This CBO scoring policy has a tremendously adverse impact and is against Federal 
Government interests.  Simply put, this CBO scoring policy undermines the original purpose for 
which Congress intended ESPCs, which is to permit agencies to introduce rational economic 
upgrades that permanently reduce net costs to the taxpayer. 
This CBO scoring policy further undermines the beneficial expansion of ESPCs to the 
non-installation applications, as was provided for in H.R. 3339 and S. 2318.  These upgrades to 
combat aircraft, tanks and ships are where the majority of benefits to the Federal government 
would accrue.  Because ESPCs in this application also increase the combat range and reliability 
of military forces, the adverse impact of this CBO policy will result in American forces being sent 
into battle with less than the best available weapons and support systems per dollar spent.   
While a healthy debate can always be made on what is the right level of military 
spending, it is unconscionable that once that level is set, we do not provide our warfighters the 
most powerful capability that this amount of money can buy.   
In a Perfect World 
While the immediate solution would be to reverse the CBO’s scoring policy on paid-from-
savings contracting, there is a more proactive approach that should be considered.  The best 
solution is to adopt more responsible policy along the following lines: 
a. The overall acquisition process should result in the compilation and maintenance of a list 
of acquisitions that make economic and operational sense, using rational and 
intellectually honest lifecycle cost-benefit analysis. 
b. Pay for as many of these acquisitions as possible with the limited capital appropriations 
available each year.  Regardless of how the projects are prioritized (economic priorities 
will often lose out to political, strategic and tactical priorities), at the end of the process 
there will be unfunded but worthy acquisitions. 
c. For each unfunded but desired acquisition, determine if the potential cost of the 
acquisition would be offset by a corresponding savings generated by the acquisition. 
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d. In cases where such an offset is sufficient to cover a multi-year amortization of the 
acquisition, Federal agencies should be encouraged to use multi-year contracting 
authority to match the rate of new spending for the upgrade to the rate of new savings 
generated by the upgrade. 
e. Require agencies to consider total savings to the US Treasury, not just savings in their 
corner of the Federal government.  Rational accounting rules for a national government 
should not encourage tribalism. 
Finally, it should be recognized that some upgrades do eventually get funded through 
the traditional acquisition process.  Defenders of the status quo are quick to point to these 
examples as evidence that the traditional system works.  The flaw in this logic is that years of 
potential savings are lost forever while upgrades wait in line for full funding.  The net effect of 
this folly is that taxpayers and warfighters are cheated for the sake of blind obedience to a 
bureaucratic system that serves no one but itself. 
 
  
                  Acquisition Research: CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE 
 
 
2003 - 2006 Sponsored Acquisition Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Managing Services Supply Chain 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to Shipyard 
Planning Processes  
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 Spiral Development 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
Contract Management 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 Contractors in 21st Century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution 
Financial Management 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Capital Budgeting for DoD 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Acquisitions via leasing: MPS case 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
Logistics Management 
 R-TOC Aegis Microwave Power Tubes 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 Army LOG MOD 
  
                  Acquisition Research: CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE 
 
 
 PBL (4) 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 RFID (4) 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to Aegis and SSDS 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module Acquisition 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research within the Acquisition 




Acquisition research Program 
Graduate school of business & public policy 
Naval postgraduate school 
555 DYER ROAD, INGERSOLL HALL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943 
www.acquisitionresearch.org  
